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CORPORATIONS
Milton M. Harrison*
In Scobee v. Continental Hotel Corp.,' one of the incorpora-
tors subscribed to fifty percent of the shares of the corporation,
and the articles of incorporation recited that he was the owner
of the shares. However, no payment for the shares was made
and the other principal shareholder and incorporator assumed
complete control of the corporation and considered himself one
hundred percent owner. After several years, petitioner sought a
writ of mandamus to compel the corporation, its president, and
secretary to deliver a certificate of stock evidencing petitioner's
ownership of fifty percent of the stock. The court held that in
the absence of having followed the procedure provided by stat-
ute2 for disposing of subscriber's stock when payment is not
made, the subscriber continues to be owner of the shares and is
entitled to have the certificate delivered to him, upon making
payment therefor.
It is required by statute that when parole evidence is ad-
missible, "the debt or liability of the deceased must be proved by
the testimony of at least one creditable witness other than the
claimant .... ,,3 In B. Stern Co. v. Perry,4 the court held that testi-
mony of the vice president of the corporation was the testimony
of the corporation (the claimant) and was not that of one credit-
able witness other than the claimant; thus, the statutory require-




The statutory fire policy provides that no suit shall be sus-
tainable "unless commenced within twelve (12) months next
after inception of the loss." In Finkelstein v. American Insurance
Co. of Newark,' the supreme court had held that the twelve
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 242 So.2d 610 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
2. LA. R.S. 12:6 (1950); the same provision since the 1968 revision of Title
12 is LA. R.S. 12:71 (Supp. 1968).
S. LA. R.S. 13:3722 (Supp. 1960).
4. 246 So.2d 246 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971), rehearing denied, April 19, 1971.
* Member, Eaton Rouge Bar.
1. 222 La. 516, 62 So.2d 820 (1952).
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month period did not commence to run until "after ascertainment
of the loss" as provided in the policy either by agreement or by
appraisal. The Finkelstein case not only unnecessarily distorted
the policy language, but also virtually wrote prescription out of
the policy since "ascertainment of the loss" was the very thing
which is not done with neglected claims.
In Gremillion v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,2 the Louisiana
Supreme Court expressly overruled the Finkelstein case, holding
that "inception of the loss" means what it says-that is, the date
the loss occurs. Noting that the language of the statutory fire
policy was that of the legislature and not the insurance com-
pany, the court found the legislative intent clearly expressed.
The court in Gremillion further found that there had been no
action by the insurer constituting a waiver of prescription, nor
had the company lulled the insured into a false belief that he
would be paid. The court thus clearly retained the tools neces-
sary to permit recovery in any case in which there has been
reprehensible conduct by the insurer. In recognizing the weak-
ness of the Finkelstein decision and accordingly overruling it,
the supreme court in Gremillion re-establishes a workable rule
of prescription in harmony with the plain policy language. Al-
though insurance policies are to be liberally construed in favor
of the insured, obvious distortion of policy provisions under the
guise of interpretation is not warranted whether the policy lan-
guage is conventional or statutory.
Gibsland Supply v. American Employers Insurance Co.,8 is
the first state court case to pass squarely on the issue whether,
in the event of a partial loss to immovable property under a fire
policy, the insured is entitled to the full cost of repair or whether
the insurer is entitled to deduct depreciation. The court found
that the cost of repair was approximately $8,000, and the insurer
contended that it was entitled to deduct $2,000 as "betterment."
The court held that any pertinent policy language was subject
to R.S. 22:695, commonly known as the "Valued Policy Law."
In the case of partial damage, Subsection B provides that the
insurer shall pay to the insured such amount "as will permit the
insured to restore the damaged property to its original condi-
tion." In the only prior case dealing squarely with this provision,
2. 256 La. 974, 240 So.2d 727 (1970).
3. 242 So.2d 310 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970), wr4t refused, 257 La. 987, 244
So.2d 858 (1971).
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the United States Court of Appeals on Reliance Insurance Co. v.
Orleans Parish School Board,4 held that replacement-cost-less-
depreciation was the standard to be applied. The Gibsland court
flatly rejected the federal court holding and ruled that the
statute does not permit deduction of depreciation. Thus, the in-
sured was permitted to recover the full cost of repair. "Original
condition" is an ambiguous phrase; if another result were in-
tended, the statute requires legislative clarification.
In first party claims, the insured and the insurer often agree
that a certain portion of the alleged loss is owed, and the real
dispute concerns only the remainder of the claim. In their eager-
ness to dispose of the entire claim, insurers occasionally fail or
refuse to pay the undisputed portion timely. Two recent cases
again emphasize that there is no legal justification for the insurer
to withhold the agreed portion of the loss, and the undisputed
amount must be tendered timely to avoid the statutory penalties
and attorneys' fees. 5
Insurance on the Person
In Hammond v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co.,6
the plaintiff brought suit for accidental death benefits on a policy
suspending coverage "in time of war." The insured died in a
fire aboard the aircraft carrier Oriskany in the Gulf of Tonkin
while serving as a lieutenant in the United States Naval Reserve.
Finding that there had been no formal declaration of war in the
Viet Nam conflict, the court held that the exclusionary provision
was not applicable. The issue was res nova in Louisiana, and
there was conflicting jurisprudence from other jurisdictions. The
court relied on a Pennsylvania case7 concerning the Korean
Conflict which observed that our military forces have been en-
gaged in more than 150 various conflicts in other countries. To
include within the definition of "war" any hostility other than
that formally declared by Congress would leave an insured with-
out any definite and uniform standard.
Liability and Related Coverages
Most policies with uninsured motorist benefits provide dollar
4. 322 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1963).
5. Spano v. Emmco Ins. Co., 239 So.2d 434 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970);
Benoit v. American Mutual Ins. Co., 236 So.2d 674 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
6. 243 So.2d 902 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
7. Beley v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2d 202
(1953).
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for dollar credit for amounts received by an insured as work-
men's compensation benefits. Application of the credit provision
was approved in Allen v. United States Fidelity & Casualty Co.8
In Williams v. Buckelew,9 however, the court took an about-face,
accepting the argument that such a credit provision was in direct
conflict with R.S. 22:1406 which requires certain minimum limits
of uninsured motorist coverage. Allen was expressly overruled
to the extent that it permitted reduction of the statutory mini-
mum limits.
The workmen's compensation carrier is not subrogated to the
insured's right to receive benefits under the uninsured motorist
coverage. Therefore, the plaintiff in Williams was permitted
to recover the full uninsured motorist limits plus his full work-
men's compensation benefits. Good arguments can be mustered
to support both the Williams and Allen positions. The result in
Williams is not offensive because the value of the plaintiff's
serious injuries exceeded the sum of both his workmen's com-
pensation and uninsured motorist recoveries. However, if the
Williams holding is extended to include claims valued at less
than this sum, the insured is given a "double" recovery which
does not appear to be the intent of the statutes requiring unin-
sured motorist coverage.
In Deshotel v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,10 the court permitted
a direct action by the father against his son's insurer. The court
expressed no opinion as to whether public policy would dictate
an immunity for the son from a suit by the father, holding that
such immunity would be personal to the son and could not be
pleaded by his insurer. This holding is consistent with the prior
jurisprudence which recognizes that the insurer sued directly
may plead only general defenses and not the personal immuni-
ties of its insured. 11
As long as it acts in good faith and the settlements are rea-
sonable, an insurer faced with multiple claimants and inadequate
policy limits may settle with some of the injured persons, thereby
depleting or exhausing the funds available for other claimants.12
8. 188 So.2d 741 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966), writs refused, 249 La. 743, 190
So.2d 909.
9. 246 So.2d 58 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
10. 257 La. 567, 243 So.2d 259 (1971).
11. E.g., Edwards v. Royal Indem. Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935).
12. Richard v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 254 La. 429, 223 So.2d
858 (1969).
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In Jack v. Jack,18 the plaintiff contended that the insurer must
bear the burden of proving that its settlements were reasonable
and made in good faith. The court flatly rejected this contention,
placing the burden squarely upon the plaintiff attacking the
settlements.
Recently, there has arisen a conflict between primary and
excess insurers over the question whether the primary insurer is
obligated to defend the excess insurer when both carriers are
joined in the suit. The issue now seems well settled that the
primary insurer has no obligation to defend the excess carrier. 4
PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION: LAW AND PROCEDURE
Melvin G. Dakin*
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
In Truck Service Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commis-
sion,' an application for contract carriage of certain steel prod-
ucts was granted with modifications. A motor carrier having
common carrier authority from the commission intervened in
the proceeding and opposed the application on the ground that
existing common carrier service was adequate to serve the ship-
per. The applicant sought to show an inadequacy in present ser-
vice by evidence that it was not economical for a common carrier
to maintain the necessary trucks or trailers readily available for
shipper's exclusive use. The applicant also showed that the com-
mon carrier had only intrastate authority and that interline con-
nections would be required if the traffic were to be handled by
the common carrier. Special need was allegedly shown by evi-
dence that these disadvantages would be remedied by the con-
tract carrier. Our supreme court affirmed the granting of the
application by the commission. In doing so it alluded to the
United States Supreme Court holding in I.C.C. v. J. T. Transport
Co., 2 and noted that:
13. 240 So.2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
14. Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 239 So.2d
472 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Fusilier v. Dixie Auto Ins. Co. 238 So.2d 223
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 256 La. 343, 236 So.2d 491 (1970).
2. 368 U.S. 81 (1961).
